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Introduction 
 Deep under the heart of Manchester city centre lies a large network of reinforced 
concrete tunnels known as the Guardian Underground Telephone Exchange (GUTE). It is an 
ageing relic from the beginning of the Cold War era, built with some degree of secrecy in the 
mid 1950s, but it still operates silently and largely unmanned as an infrastructural space 
facilitating the communications of those above. Surprisingly little information regarding the 
GUTE is readily accessible and the subterranean nature of the structure itself acts to entomb the 
reality of its shape and scale. A lack of concrete information has allowed facts to be supplanted 
by myths, fostering numerous (mis)perceptions of the same intangible space. The GUTE was 
conceived during a time of escalating international tensions in the early 1950s as a ‘hardened’ 
bunker to protect vital national communication links in the event of an atomic bomb attack 
upon Manchester. However, this defining characteristic of subterranean defence was never 
achieved because, even before construction was complete in 1958, advances in nuclear 
weapons yield and the accuracy of intercontinental ballistic missiles meant the tunnel design 
would be ineffective for protection of the telecommunications machinery and personnel 
working within. The bombproof tunnels still exist but the condition of nuclear confrontation 
does not.  
 Discussion of a possible ‘nuclear bunker’ beneath Manchester is one that has stirred 
interest amongst the public for decades.1 Despite formal declassification from the secrecy 
imposed on the GUTE in 1968, there are still speculations and myths surrounding its supposed 
                                                
1 This might be read as part of the spectacle secrecy that has become evermore apparent in the past decade around 
military and state security, see Chris Perkins and Martin Dodge, ‘Satellite imagery and the spectacle of secret 
spaces’, Geoforum, 40 (2009), 546-60. More broadly there is a psychological fascination in the public imagination 
with what 'lurks' unseen in the subterranean realm; see Rosalind Williams, Notes on the Underground 
(Cambridge, MA, 2008). 
  
 2 
‘top-secret’ agenda. Such unsubstantiated theories are propagated, in part, by the mysterious 
‘disappearance’ of web-based resources2 and more recent expenditure on the physical security 
of known access points to a decommissioned underground telephone exchange . A formal 
written enquiry to BT in October 2011 from the authors in preparation for a public exhibition 
concerning a sanctioned visit to the GUTE went unanswered, as did an e-mail enquiry to 
facilities management company SPIE Matthew Hall, whose liveried vans have been observed 
in a street level secure compound known to serve the underground exchange complex. The last 
known visit by members of the public was made in 1997 by a group from the Manchester Civic 
Society and recorded in their newsletter in a tone understandably tinged with a certain air of 
mystery: ‘Entering "somewhere in Piccadilly", we descended via four flights of stairs then a lift 
to the centre of the Earth.’3 This sustained secrecy does not, however, prevent the unfolding of 
the known and published facts. 
 In this article we seek to document the physical extent, architectural structure and 
operational history of the GUTE that we have been able to piece together from available public 
sources and reliable first hand accounts. As far as we are aware no official history of the GUTE 
has been published and there are only scant details in the records held at the British Telecom 
(BT) Archives4 and no detailed maps, design drawings or original construction plans of the 
tunnels or related surface building are currently publicly accessible. A range of historical 
photography and some amateur video of the GUTE is available and we draw upon a selection 
of this below and provide references to the sources. We have not visited the GUTE. 
 
 
                                                
2 Subterranea Britannica, a membership society documenting the histories of underground structures used to have 
an informative web page on the GUTE which was replaced in 1999 by a link to a blog entry by Mancubist 
<www.mancubist.co.uk/2006/07/25/guardian-exchange-manchesters-cold-war-bunkers>, which is full of 
speculative commentary about the nature of the tunnels and in many respects only serves to reinforce the 
mythology. Other websites have been ‘relocated’ and are not retrievable using popular Internet search engines. 
 
3 Peggy Kynaston, ‘An undiscovered world beneath our feet’, Forum, the newsletter of the Manchester Civic 
Society, December 1997. A transcribed version is available from <www.atomica.co.uk/guardian/forum.htm> 
[Accessed 18 August 2012]. 
 
4 Refs: Post 122/1049, 1050, 1051, Underground installations with regards to the Post Office Works Act 1959, 
parts 1-3,  
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Cold War constructions, communications and civil defence  
The way to win an atomic war is to make certain it never starts. 
US Army General, Omar N. Bradley [1893-1981] 
 Whilst the Cold War did not involve any direct military exchanges between the two 
super powers, it did provoke preparations for war on a massive scale, including huge 
investment in nuclear weapons technology and delivery systems. While aerial surveillance and 
covert espionage by both sides was intensively employed to acquire strategically advantageous 
information about the enemy’s weapons systems and location of important facilities. It was 
unclear when, or where, the enemy would strike, leaving paranoid politicians and military 
chiefs operating in secrecy on the brink of perceived annihilation. The uncertainty of an attack 
meant that a large part of war preparations involved the construction of protected facilities and 
defensive systems.5 The result is a global array of specialised Cold War military structures, 
with distinctive architectural forms built at great expense. The most iconic of these structures is 
perhaps the least visible to public scrutiny – the underground command and control bunker.6  
 These structures included the expansion of an architectural typology built for defence, 
the majority of which were designed to listen (by means of surveillance) and monitor for an 
incoming attack, in order to create the temporal window needed to retaliate effectively. Soon 
after the end of the Second World War many of the UK’s chain of radar stations had been 
decommissioned but with heightening tension by the early 1950s this situation was reversed, 
spurred on more so by the rapidity with which the Soviet Union had detonated its first atom 
bomb (August 1949).7 Operation Rotor sought to refurbish Britain’s wartime radar and 
listening posts, and also involved the construction of a network of relatively small bunkers 
capable of withstanding the destructive effects of an atomic bomb in which the Royal Observer 
                                                
5 For a comprehensive survey of structures in the UK conducted by English Heritage, see Wayne D. Cocroft, R. J. 
C. Thomas, and P.S. Barnwell, Cold War: Building for Nuclear Confrontation 1946-1989 (Swindon, 2003). 
 
6 For reviews of the architectural form and some of the social meanings attached to such bunker spaces, see: Tom 
Vanderbilt, Survival City: Adventures Among the Ruins of Atomic America (New York, 2002); Nick Catford, Cold 
War Bunkers (Bradford-on-Avon, 2010); John Beck, ‘Concrete ambivalence: Inside the bunker complex’, 
Cultural Politics, 7 (2011) 79-102; Luke Bennett ‘The bunker: metaphor, materiality and management’, Culture 
and Organization, 17 (2011) 155-173.  
 
7 Code named First Lightning the 20 kiloton explosion was roughly equivalent to that of the first US atomic bomb 
Trinity. 
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Corps could monitor radioactive fallout.8 Cold War defensive architecture was utilitarian in 
style and was driven in large part by the advances of the technology that it housed.  
 Despite the evident fear of annihilation amongst the public, the provision of protective 
underground spaces for the populace was not a priority of the governing classes. The popular 
conception that Manchester, as a major population centre, would have been a strategic target of 
nuclear attack was, in some senses, reinforced by the construction of the GUTE. However, 
simply by considering the types of functional space it contained, it is clear that this was not 
conceived as a shelter to provide any form of public provision in relation to civil defence. 
Although designed to withstand an atomic bomb blast, the GUTE was exclusively for the 
protection of communications equipment and the cadre of engineers required to keep it 
functioning, rather than to provide a nuclear bunker for politicians or public shelter. In contrast, 
in the USA a considerable amount of attention was lavished on giving the public the 
impression that they were being protected,9 signs at many locations across major American 
cities show buildings were adapted or allocated for public shelters. The level of protection 
offered by these typically urban examples would likely have been negligible and the signs were 
more a tool to convince the public of the plans to safeguard them, rather than prevent actual 
harm. Major expense was outlaid in Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries to provide 
extensive civilian fallout shelters.10 Evans explains that a major reason for the lack of similar 
constructions in the UK was down to cost, Britain had endured a shattered economy and a 
decade or more of severe post-war austerity. As an illustration of this, a letter from the Home 
Office to MP Mr Nicholas Scott stated that, ‘the estimated cost of providing family concrete 
underground shelters to only 10 million homes, based on a design of which we have some 
knowledge, is between £60,000 million and £80,000 million’.11 Moreover, targets for an attack 
                                                                                                                                                     
  
8 See Cocroft et al. (2003), pp. 84-123; Mark Dalton, The Royal Observer Corps Underground Monitoring Posts 
(Bradford-on-Avon, 2011); and also Cold Ward Bunkers and Radar Stations 
<www.thetimechamber.co.uk/Sites/Civil/Rotor.php>, [Accessed 5 January 2012]. 
 
9  Dan Churney, ‘Fallout Fever: Civil Defense shelters dotted area cities during the Cold War’, 9 August 2008, 
<http://mywebtimes.com/archives/ottawa/display.php?id=366305> [Accessed 5 January 2012].  
 
10 R.G Little, Pattak, P.B. and Scroeder, V.A. Use of Underground Facilities to Protect Critical Infrastructures: 
Summary of a Workshop (Washington DC, 1998) p.31. 
 
11 Quoted in Peter Evans, ‘The UK front’ In: The Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies. Nuclear 
attack civil defence: aspects of civil defence in the nuclear age: a symposium (Oxford, 1982), p.175. A copy is 
available from <http://desastres.unanleon.edu.ni/pdf/2002/diciembre/pdf/eng/doc2517/doc2517-4a.pdf>  
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could only be speculated upon and the real effects were uncertain early in the Cold War.12 
Evans, for example, quotes Air Marshal Sir Leslie Mayor, RAF (retired), Principle of the 
Home Defence College, at a NATO civil defence training seminar in 1977, ‘[t]he attack will be 
aimed at putting us quickly out of the reckoning by disabling the country militarily, politically 
and economically’.13 He went on to assert that the main targets would be knocked out, unable 
to administer self-aid. These targets would have to be discounted until, less damaged regions 
could recover and then come to their aid. If, as was likely, Manchester was considered a prime 
target, this could explain the reason for no visible effort at providing public shelter capability. 
The ability of the GUTE to remain functional during an attack would be vital in maintaining 
national communications; its purpose was not about the protection of the city populace or 
regional resilience. As such the civil defence could be summarised as follows:  
‘In the absence of a shelter for the general populace, the accent has been put on 
retaining the means of regeneration. That implied a need for the survival of 
government. Thus the result has been on the protection of government, a policy that 
critics now compare with the lack of protection of the ordinary populace. ‘Elitist’, is the 
charge  levelled at Britain’s present Civil Defence policy.’14 
 Instead of shelter provision and mass population evacuation, the alternative civil 
defence strategy was for the public to stay put and try to survive at home. Advice found in 
Civil Defence Handbook No. 10, published in 1963, directed householders to construct a fallout 
shelter or core within their own property.15 The ideal location for such a makeshift shelter was 
proposed as a room on the ground floor of the house, with as few outside facing walls as 
possible. It was advised that the inner core should be a lean-to structure, made from doors, or 
even to use the cupboard under the stairs. The walls of the core could be made thicker by the 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
12 The lethal impacts of radioactive fall-out, widespread and long lasting compared to the immediate bomb blast, 
became apparent to the upper echelons of the British Government in December 1954 with the distribution of the 
Strath Report ('The Defence Implications of Fall-out from a Hydrogen Bomb'). Cf. Robin Woolven, 'UK civil 
defence and nuclear weapons 1953-1959', UK Nuclear History Working Paper No. 2 (2007), 
<www.mcis.soton.ac.uk/Site_Files/pdf/nuclear_history/Working_Paper_No_2.pdf>. 
 
13 Evans (1982), p. 174. 
 
14 Evans (1982), p.174-75. 
 
15 See discussion in Tracy C. Davis, Stages of Emergency: Cold War Nuclear Civil Defense (Durham, North 
Carolina, 2007). 
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stacking of furniture and other items found around the house. Occupants were then to remain 
inside their shelters for up to fourteen days after a blast, in order to survive the worst effects of 
radioactive fallout.  
Similar advice was still being propagated by the British Government decades later, 
exemplified in the Protect and Survive pamphlet, published in 1980 by Home Office, along 
with a series of short animated films intended to educate and advise the public on the prospect 
of nuclear confrontation16. They were part propaganda and partly the typical paternalistic 
attitude of the British State to its subjects. 
‘If nuclear weapons are used on a large scale, those of us living in the country areas 
might be exposed to as great a risk as those in the towns. The radioactive dust, falling 
where the wind blows it, will bring the most widespread dangers of all. No part of the 
United Kingdom can be considered safe from both the direct effects of the weapons and 
the resultant fall-out.’17  
The naivety of such advice, the general public’s misapprehension of the savage reality 
of nuclear war conditions and faith in such a plan for survival was epitomised in the 1986 film 
When the Wind Blows.18 This animated film was made during the Reagan era confrontation 
with the USSR, and in a grainy, gloomy tone, follows an elderly working class couple, through 
the process of constructing a shelter following government guidelines, surviving the actual 
attack and eventually succumbing to the effects of fallout. Two years earlier the BBC 
television drama Threads had been heavily criticised by the government for its excessively 
bleak – and realistic – portrayal of post-bomb survival.19  
  
                                                                                                                                                     
 
16 A scanned copy of the pamphlet is available at <www.atomica.co.uk>. An example of the films produced is 
available at, <www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/films/1964to1979/filmpage_warnings.htm>. 
 
17 Home Office, Protect and Survive (HMSO, 1980), p.1. 
 
18 Jimmy T. Murakami [Director], Raymond Briggs [Author], When the Wind Blows (Meltdown Productions, Film 
Four, 1986). 
 
19 It was self-censored by the BBC following the criticism and not shown again on British television for nearly 
twenty years. See Toby Emden, Ten to Midnight. The end of the world as we know it (Stingray Books, 2007), p. 8; 
Sean O’Sullivan, ‘No such things as society: Television and the apocalypse’, in Lester D. Friedman, [ed] Fires 
Were Started: British Cinema and Thatcherism (London, 2006), pp. 223-242. 
 7 
 As the provision of public shelters did not make up part of the Britain’s civil defence 
strategy, one could speculate that public knowledge of the presence and the scale of GUTE and 
other underground exchanges may have been considered to have the potential to induce public 
disquiet. Certainly, this danger was flagged in secret Cabinet Office discussions in September 
1951 relating to newspaper stories about tunnelling activity in London, where it was noted: ‘It 
would be embarrassing to the Government if the public got the impression that deep shelters 
were being constructed. Either the public would think that the Government were out to protect 
their own skins …or … assume that the shelters were intended for public use in the time of war 
and would be disappointed when they found they were not.’20 It was overtly stipulated that any 
enquiries about tunnel construction should be met with the answer that the works were for 
mundane GPO purposes and at some point during the mid 1950s a ‘D Notice’ was applied to 
the whole underground telephone exchanges project to prevent any press reporting of their 
construction21. The Act of Parliament passed in 1959 to retrospectively authorise the tunnelling 
and place the exchanges on a legal footing, was deliberately blandly entitled as the Post Office 
Works Act,22 and when the bill was read in House of Lords it was set out that the works were 
mundane and ‘used for essential Post Office purposes.’23 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
20 Note of meeting 6th September 1951 (GEN.379/1st Meeting). The National Archives, ref. CAB 21/3999. 
 
21 Letter by T.A. O'Brien, 25th February 1954. The National Archives, ref. CAB 21/3999. 
 
22 Post Office Works Act, Ch. 43, Clause 7. 1959. BT Archives, ref. POST 122/1049. 
 
23 House of Lords debate, 20th January 1959, Hansard vol. 213 cc563-6. Available from 
<http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1959/jan/20/post-office-works-bill>. 
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Table 1. Keys events relating to GUTE and wider Cold War contexts. (Source: Compilation by the authors 
from various sources cited in the text.) 
1945 [July 16] Trinity, the test of the first atomic bomb in New Mexico 
1949 [Aug. 29] Soviet Union tests its first atomic bomb at Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan 
1952 Salford site [Islington St?] is purchased for access shaft to GUTE  
1952 [Oct. 3] Britain tests its first atomic bomb on the Montebello Islands, Western Australia 
1953? Breaking ground on GUTE shafts 
1954 … 1957 Major progress in tunnelling works on GUTE 
1954 [Mar. 1] Test of the first thermonuclear (hydrogen) bomb on Bikini atoll in the Pacific by the US 
1958 Construction of GUTE structure is largely complete, equipment fit out  
1958 [Dec. 7] At 8.00am the GUTE opens to telephone traffic as trunk non-director exchange 
1959 GUTE fully operational as an exchange after the installation of additional equipment 
1959 Post Office Works Act passed to give Postmaster General the retrospective legal powers to 
maintain communications systems in deep excavations in London, Birmingham and 
Manchester 
1967 Rutherford Exchange (in surface building), completed to provide space for new standard 
trunk dialling system 
1968 [Oct. 21] Declassification of GUTE (and the exchanges in London and Birmingham) by Postmaster-
General Stonehouse’s official announcement to Parliament. Removal of D-Notice meant 
that these ‘secret’ facilities could be reported in the press 
1969 [Jan.] Minor fire in GUTE reported 
1972 Short 110 metre segment of new tunnelling finished to directly link recently completed 
Irwell House exchange building in Salford to the GUTE cable route 
1970 Peter Laurie publishes his book Beneath City Streets, which provides some of first detailed 
public discussion of Cold War communications and civil defence facilities 
1980 [Nov.] Manchester declares itself to be the first British Nuclear Free City 
1981  1981 British Telecommunications Act passed meaning that Post Office 
Telecommunications became a state-owned corporation independent of the Post Office 
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1983 [Mar. 22] Manchester Evening News prints Michael Duffy’s story about his tour of GUTE  
1984 Privatisation of BT 
1988 GUTE ceases to operate as a telephone exchange 
1989 [Nov.] Fall of the Berlin Wall signifies the collapse of the Communist block and end of the Cold 
War 
1997 Members of Manchester Civic Society conducted an authorised visit to GUTE 
1998 [July] English Heritage photographer visits GUTE to document the tunnels and working spaces 
2002 Stories in local press about GUTE and plans for BT sell off the tunnels for other use 
2004 [Mar. 29] Significant fire occurs in the Guardian exchange tunnels 
2005 Access to GUTE by unauthorised ‘explorers’ 
2007 Keith Warrender publishes his book Underground Manchester, spurring new interest in the 
GUTE 
 
The 1950s communications context 
 The primary role of the extensive complex of tunnels constructed beneath Manchester’s 
city centre was to house a hardened telephone exchange and ancillary equipment to maintain 
key government and military communications in the event of a nuclear attack. The GUTE was 
one of three similar city centre installations constructed under conditions of some secrecy 
about its purpose and details on its size and depth;24 the other two sites were in central London 
(exchange codenamed Kingsway) and Birmingham (the Anchor exchange). Existing tunnels 
from the deep shelter programme enacted during the Second World War in London were 
extended in 1951 to house the Kingsway underground telephone exchange beneath High 
Holborn. Trunk lines carried communications north through exchanges at Birmingham and on 
to Manchester. Anchor exchange was constructed under the Newhall Street area of 
Birmingham city centre, close what is now Paradise Circus, with three access shafts and long 
cable tunnels running away from complex in a north-westerly and south-easterly directions to 
                                                
24 It was some decades later before speculative details became public, most particularly through books by Peter 
Laurie, Beneath the City Streets (London, 1970) and Duncan Campbell, War Plan UK (London, 1982). It was 
more formally documented by English Heritage in the 1990s, cf. Cocroft et al. (2003), pp 218-225. 
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secondary surface exchanges.25 The GUTE was similar in facilities layout to Kingsway but 
reportedly had the addition of a room allocated for the Civil Defence Corps.26 The GUTE was 
also the smallest of the three exchanges providing accommodation for about 35 engineering 
maintenance staff, which compared to 140 in Kingsway and around 60 in Anchor.27 Anchor 
and, especially, Kingsway are well-recorded and represented with contemporary photography 
and video readily available online, in contrast to the scant amount of information about 
Guardian.28  
 Funding for the construction of the tunnels was made available from the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) as the exchanges were deemed vital infrastructure needed for 
strategic defence. It seems that similar deep underground telecommunications facilities in 
Bristol and Glasgow were initially planned during this period but never constructed.29 
 Peter Laurie in his book Beneath the City Streets (1970) explained to a wider public 
that after a nuclear attack telecommunications would be vital to the ability of any form of 
organised government to function. For reasons of economy a hardened civil defence 
communication system was contained within the peacetime domestic trunk phone lines. This 
system could then switch use quickly in the event of an attack. As the former chairman of 
Cable & Wireless commented in 1947, ‘[a]n emergency circuit consists primarily of a 
                                                
25 Initial tunnelling works were reportedly explained with a cover story that it was for an underground railway to 
relieve city centre congestion; cf. Sebastian Ballard , 'Site Name: Birmingham Anchor Telephone Exchange', 
Subterranea Britannica, March 2003, <www.subbrit.org/rsg/sites/b/birmingham_anchor_exchange/index.html>. 
Some impression of the Anchor tunnels can be ascertained from a short BBC Midlands Today news report filmed 
in 1998, a copy can be viewed at <www.youtube.com/watch?v=28e35wmElCY>. 
 
26 Cocroft et al. (2003), p. 220. It is unclear whether this space was ever used for such a purpose. 
 
27  Keith Warrender, Below Manchester (Timperley, Cheshire, 2009), p. 236. 
 
28 Contemporary reporting includes: A Sky News report on the sale of Kingsway, posted online on 18 October 
2008, <www.youtube.com/watch?v=dmSblwFurbI>. Graham Ruddick, ‘Kingsway tunnels: See inside one of 
London’s most unusual property [sic.]’, The Telegraph, 23 January 2009.  
<www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/4324339/Kingsway-Tunnels-See-inside-one-of-Londons-most-unusual-
property.html> [Accessed 19 January 2012].  Mick Herron, 2009, ‘What lies beneath’, Engineering & 
Technology, 11 April, 90-91. It is also well documented online, cf. <www.subbrit.org.uk/rsg/sites/k/kingsway/>.  
 
29 Nick J. McCamley, Cold War Secret Nuclear Bunkers (Barnsley, 2002), p. 230. According to Andrew 
Emmerson’s research a panoply of schemes around British cities to provide more resilient telecommunications 
infrastructure was planned in the early 1950s. Most were never built due to budgetary restriction (see his article 
‘Communications in context: plans for protection’, Subterranea 13 (2007), 34-41). 
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switchable portion, normally in use for the public system, which can be connected quickly at 
two local ends’.30 These lines were considered hardened by the fact the cables ran two to three 
feet underground and the connection points were linked by at least two separate routes. (In 
other cases cables were physically rerouted around potential targets.) Along the routes of the 
cables protected repeater (PR) stations were built, typically as semi-submerged, windowless 
concrete bunkers with independent emergency power from generators.31 Further measures were 
taken to protect the main exchanges and terminals through which these lines passed. The 
safeguarding of such places was key to the protection of communications: ‘The exchanges and 
the organisations they are to serve must be housed in well-protected places, because they are 
the ganglia of the thermonuclear bomb resistant brain. If they are damaged, the government 
creature is blind, deaf and dumb’.32  
Discussions took place in the early 1950s on the strategic necessity and financial 
feasibility of building a survival communications network to support national defence 
operations and essential governmental tasks in the event of an atomic war. This was envisioned 
as an additional layer of telecommunications infrastructure because the ‘main long distance 
cable network … terminates in, or passes through, the largest cities in the country, and depends 
for its operation on equipment located in these cities’. These cities would be prime targets and 
likely to be laid waste by Soviet bombs. According to a Cabinet Office briefing paper in 1956, 
which was classified as Top Secret, the Post Office had plans to mitigate this vulnerability by 
engineering new communications routes using three distinct schemes. Firstly, the Skeleton 
network, costing £3m, that was purposefully designed as a ‘multiplicity of cables up and down 
the country which do not pass through the largest towns’. Secondly and more ambitious was 
the £9.2m Backbone scheme for 14 large microwave towers, each located about 34 miles apart, 
positioned in line-of-sight out in the countryside. This chain of antennas would ‘meet the 
essential need for an alternative line of communication running from north to south of the 
country to carry circuits between the planned Seat of Government (and its standby), the various 
operational Headquarters of the Defence Services, the Regional Headquarters and other 
Government establishments.’ A third layer, to supplement Skeleton and Backbone, were 
                                                
30 Laurie (1970);  S. Angwin, ‘Untitled’, Journal of the Institution of Electrical Engineers, 94, 3, (1947), 7. 
 
31 Catford (2010), pp. 155-59; Emmerson, A. ‘Stockport protected repeater station’, Subterranea 6 (2004) p.22-25. 
 
32 Laurie (1970), p.149. 
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specific radio standby-to-line link to provide physically separate interconnect with key defence 
facilities.33    
It is unclear how much of these three layers of infrastructure were enacted, given the 
severe constraints on government spending. At least part of the Backbone scheme was built 
because the towers became part of the more general microwave communications network in 
the mid 1960s and they remain prominent features in the landscape, despite the removal of the 
striking trapezoidal coned antennae.34 Manchester was likely to have been connected into this 
network from the seventy-three metre tall concrete tower at Sutton Common, near Macclesfield 
and possibly via the prominent microwave antenna which opened in 1965 in Heaton Park, 
north of the city centre.35 
Mapping GUTE: Position, tunnel extents and core layout, and surface buildings 
 There are few public details on the siting decisions, layout or specific design of the 
tunnels for the GUTE. To the best of our knowledge no official maps of the tunnel extents or 
construction plans have been released into the public domain.36 We have pieced together 
details and the following description is presented as only a provisional account of the size and 
structure of GUTE. The main part of the Guardian Exchange is estimated to be thirty-four 
metres below ground, (actual tunnel depths were deemed a key secret during construction and 
remain unclear) and comprises a core warren of habitable equipment tunnels under the 
Chinatown area of Manchester city centre with smaller cable tunnels, just over two metres in 
diameter, that double as emergency escape routes, extending out to two vertical shafts in 
Salford and one at Ardwick (Figure 1).  
                                                
33 Details and quotes in this paragraph are taken from 'Backbone radio link and radio standby to line links for 
safeguarding vital communications', General Post Office, July 1956. The National Archives, ref. CAB 134/1207. 
A transcribed version of the document is available on <http://yourarchives.nationalarchives.gov.uk/index.php? 
title=Backbone_radio_link_and_radio_standby_to_line_links_for_safeguarding_vital_communications>. 
 
34 For further details see: Steve Fox and Richard Lamont, ‘The Towers of Backbone’, Subterranea Britannica, 
June 2003, <www.subbrit.org/rsg/features/backbone>. 
 
35 'Tower widens scope for TV and telephones', The Guardian, 9 October, 1965, p. 4. 
36 A basic layout plan of core tunnels in relation to land ownership is provided as part of the Book of Reference 
that accompanies the Post Office Works Bill, November 1958. A copy is held at Manchester City Archives, ref. 
M626 / Crate 12 / 2. An outline plan of the exchange for 'safeguarding' is also held at BT Archives, Post 122/1049 
Underground installations with regards to the Post Office Works Act 1959, part 1.    
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The overall plan form of the exchange tunnels does not appear to be an explicitly 
economic or efficient configuration. The strangely contorted layout of the large equipment 
tunnels and chosen routes for the cable tunnels is probably linked to local circumstances and 
happenstance in the 1950s – e.g. the availability of land and city centre access via bomb 
damaged buildings, and perhaps dictated by geological conditions and preferred tunnelling 
techniques at that time. Why position it at all under city centre given that its purpose was to 
survive an atomic attack? It can be speculated that the city centre siting Guardian tunnels was 
to provide protection to existing long distance north-south trunk telephone cables which came 
through the middle of Manchester (connecting at Dial House and York House exchanges). 
These cables had enhanced significant in the 1950s with the building of first telephone link 
across from North America to Britain (TAT-1 opened in 1956) which would become the 
primary route of the so-called ‘hotline’ teletype service. GUTE was a trunk non-director 
telephone exchange and designed to keep traffic flowing at all costs because it was an essential 
link in the chain of Cold War communication between Washington and Moscow. Hence the 
justification of the high costs of underground construction which was met by NATO.37 
 
Figure 1. The extents of the GUTE tunnel network under Manchester city centre. (Source: Authors 
compilation. Map drawn by Graham Bowden, Cartography Unit, University of Manchester.) 




 Perhaps the best physical description of the GUTE as completed comes from a 1974 
article in a technical journal reviewing construction, hence we quote it at length: 
‘The recently completed Post Office communications tunnels join an existing network, 
provided in 1956, which extends across the two cities of Manchester and Salford. Cable 
tunnels run from Ardwick on the south side, pass beneath Deansgate, continue 
northwards under the River Irwell and westwards across Salford. They connect with a 
grid of large diameter tunnels under Piccadilly which house the telecommunications 
apparatus with its associated plant and support systems. The tunnels are basically horse-
shoe shaped but vary considerably in size and detail, and as an indication of the scope 
of the accommodation, there were eight main types of tunnel cross section, each having 
two, three or four subdivisions. They were lined with plain concrete ranging from 10 to 
36in nominal thickness except the ventilation tunnels which were constructed in 7ft 
diameter cast iron bolted rings running beneath the apparatus tunnels. The whole of the 
tunnel system lies between 100 and 200ft deep, entirely within Bunter sandstone which 
was very wet. The cable entry shafts in 12ft diameter bolted cast iron lining were sited 
on derelict plots near the cities’ existing telephone exchanges. From each shaft ran a 
short spur 9ft 6in nominal diameter tunnel.’38   
 Underground and within the core tunnel complex there are two main levels connected 
at various points by stairs. Certain sections of the tunnels are of sufficient diameter to contain 
upper and lower levels, though smaller gauge tunnels also connect the upper and lower sections 
and the idea of two levels simply stacked on top of one another does not quite represent the 
true configuration of the subterranean spaces. On the main level of the exchange, in the largest 
and longest tunnel (known as A.T.8, ‘apparatus tunnel’), were GPO engineers who would work 
to maintain the analogue telecommunications switching equipment (see Figure 7 below for 
construction photograph of this tunnel). 
 For fresh water supply there was an artesian well within the tunnel complex, it’s exact 
location is difficult to ascertain from publicly available information, but it is recorded in the 
original Post Office records as being beneath ‘Alexander Drew & Sons, 33 George St.’ and that 
the ‘surface land’ was ‘privately owned’ and that the ‘well [had been] sunk from tunnel 
                                                
38 Sydney P. Collins, ‘Tunnelling under Manchester’, Tunnels & Tunnelling, September 1974, p.30 
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level’.39 (Figure 2 indicates the likely location, marked by ‘AW’.) Sewage and other foul 
materials were collected in a tank within the tunnel complex and periodically ejected under air 
pressure into the mains sewage system.40 Air was drawn in by fans via intakes at Salford and 
Ardwick and was passed through a bank of filters to remove dust and dirt. This was not as 
efficient as it might have been and dirt was a constant threat to the mechanical operations 
which required routine and regular maintenance to keep equipment in working order.41 
 
Figure 2. The layout of core GUTE tunnels in relation to surface street. The position of the pedestrian link 
to York House is uncertain and approximated. (Source: Author’s plan. The compilation draws upon 
research by Nicholas Mitchell and the drawing provided in Wayne D. Cocroft, et al, Cold War: Building for 
Nuclear Confrontation 1946-1989 (Swindon, 2003), p.164.) 
 In terms of the overt presence of the GUTE in the city, a scattering of anonymous 
surface buildings and architecturally unremarkable commercial premises, which provide access 
via deep shafts, are the only publicly visible evidence of the tunnels existence. The two main 
entrances in the city centre are located at 56 George Street (Figure 3) and within an office 
building on (New) York Street, 42 known as York House. Steps from within York House led to 
                                                
 
39 ‘Schedule I. Scheme 567a Shafts and Shaftheads to Deep Level Tunnels’ marked kk.6.5.57. BT Archives, ref. 
POST 122/1049. 
 
40 Pers. comms. 8 November 2012 from Malcolm Graham, Technical Officer, Level 1 Manager, GUTE, 1959-
1988. 
 
41 Pers. comms. 8 November 2012 from Malcolm Graham, Technical Officer, Level 1 Manager, GUTE, 1959-
1988. 
 
42 Following Bruntwood’s acquisition of a number of properties on York Street in 2008, the improvements to the 
public realm, their redevelopment of existing premises and construction of some new offices. York Street was 
renamed New York Street in 2008. 
 
 16 
a passage beneath George Street and into the basement of Rutherford House Telephone 
Exchange from where the original shaft head was accessed (Figure 2). York House is a typical 
Edwardian building of red brick with cream coloured faince banding and dressings. It was built 
at number twenty-six York Street as a telephone exchange in 1909 to designs prepared by L. 
Stokes and J.W. Beaumont.43 The site was noted in 1957 as having a ‘subway to telephone 
exchange, plus manhole in shafthead to be superseded by normal PO building’;44 one may 
assume that this ‘normal’ building is in fact Rutherford House.  
 Rutherford House was constructed in 1967 by the Ministry of Public Buildings and 
Works, as a telephone exchange, on the corner of George Street and New York Street.45 The 
name is perhaps a reference to the nuclear era as Manchester scientist Ernest Rutherford is 
credited with being the first to ‘split the atom’ and discover protons in a series of experiments 
at the University of Manchester between 1913 and 1919.46 Rutherford was also a prominent 
member of the Manchester Literary and Philosophical Society who had premises adjacent the 
site of the new telephone exchange and, it has been said, had GPO bosses amongst the 
membership. The suggestion is that the Lit. and Phil. considered Rutherford a ‘natural 
philosopher’ and that the adoption of the name satisfied the philosophical leanings of the 
Society and the technological aspect of telecommunications.47 The original shaft head and vent 
tower have been enclosed within the service area of Rutherford House, the vent is similar in 
scale and appearance to that of 56 George Street (described below) and remains visible from 
above. The sites for both Rutherford House and the George Street compound had been bombed 
during the Second World War.48 Their availability as construction sites and their proximity to 
the existing GPO exchange at York Street may have been one factor in determining the below 
ground organisation of the tunnels.  
                                                
43 Clare Hartwell, Manchester (Penguin, 2001), p. 211. John J. Parkinson-Bailey, Manchester: An Architectural 
History (Manchester University Press, 2000), p. 344. 
 
44 ‘Schedule I. Scheme 567a Shafts and Shaftheads to Deep Level Tunnels’ marked kk.6.5.57. BT Archives, ref. 
POST 122/1049.  
 
45 Eamonn Canniffe and Tom Jefferies, Manchester Architecture Guide (Manchester, 1999), p. 95. 
 
46 Dictionary of National Biography, <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/printable/35891>. 
 
47 Pers. comms. 5 June 2012 from former GPO / BT employee with direct knowledge of GUTE..  
 
48 As evidenced by bomb damage maps held by Manchester City Archives, ref. GB127.MISC/1192. 
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  The shaft access building at 56 George Street is typically ministerial and 
reductively utilitarian in style. It is similar in appearance to an electricity sub station, but is 
surrounded by high walls and features a distinctive square ventilation tower (Figure 3). The 
mains electrical supply was routed via a small substation on the edge of the compound and 
augmented by battery supply which would come to life if the mains current was cut. For 
extended periods of power outage diesel generators down in the tunnels would provide the 
back up and the ventilation tower would allow the exhaust from the engines to escape.49 The 
engines were periodically tested and the fire brigade given advance notification of such so as to 
prevent their attending any reports of a ‘smoke coming from building on George Street’.50 If 
this route for ventilation was blocked the exhausts could also be directed along the Ardwick 
cable tunnel to Lockton Close shaft.51 According to Duncan Campbell’s early public exposé of 
the GUTE at the start of the 1980s, the George Street shaft could be capped with a thirty-five 
ton concrete slab that would have been used to seal the entrance in case of an attack.52 From 
construction photographs the slab would appear to have slid into place on rails. Hydraulic 
lifting gear, on the inside, would allow staff to exit once it was deemed safe to do so. The shaft 
is also listed as having a ‘staircase’ inside53 which were used by staff when the lifts were being 
serviced.54 It is perhaps unsurprising to note that once the slab had been slid into place and the 
blast doors (situated at various points along the cable tunnels and at the base of each vertical 
shaft) closed, that the process for the intake and extract of air remained as it was. This should 
be considered in the context of the ‘shelter and stay put’ advice issued by central government 
                                                
49 Pers. comms. 8 November 2012 from Malcolm Graham, Technical Officer, Level 1 Manager, GUTE, 1959-
1988. 
 
50 Pers. comms. 8 November 2012 from Malcolm Graham, Technical Officer, Level 1 Manager, GUTE, 1959-
1988. 
 
51 Pers. comms. 8 November 2012 from Malcolm Graham, Technical Officer, Level 1 Manager, GUTE, 1959-
1988. 
 
52 Duncan Campbell, War Plan UK: The Truth About Civil Defence in Britain (London, 1982). A photograph 
available George Coney’s Guardian website purports to show this at time of construction, 
<www.atomica.co.uk/guardian/construction.htm#slab>. 
 
53 ‘Schedule I. Scheme 567a Shafts and Shaftheads to Deep Level Tunnels’ marked kk.6.5.57. BT Archives, ref. 
POST 122/1049. 
 




and the general lack of knowledge, or publicly available information, concerning the mid to 
long term effects of high dosage radiation from nuclear weapons.  
 
 
Figure 3. [image left] Original photograph documenting the construction of the service building at 56 
George Street, Manchester, dated November 1960. Photograph taken inside the compound. The distinctive 
exhaust tower is nearly complete. (Source: Photograph by tunnel engineer Patrick Gough. Courtesy of 
George Coney.) [image right] A contemporary view of the utilitarian same building at the top of the main 
equipment lift shaft down to the GUTE. The compound now features significant physical perimeter 
security. Photograph taken from Back George Street (Source: Richard Brook). 
 Two cable tunnels, themselves large enough people to walk through, run for a 
considerable distance from central core of exchange equipment under China Town (see Figure 
2 above; Figure 4).  Available plans show these tunnels are running in straight lines and they 
end at shafts to the surface. They were marked by three nondescript small brick buildings 
located at Chapel Street and Islington Street, Salford and Lockton Close, Ardwick which 
provided routes for the telephone cables, air intakes for ventilation and emergency exits for 
GUTE workers (Figure 5). At the time of initial planning for the underground exchanges in the 
early 1950s it was likely conceived that these points would be outside the immediate blast zone 
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of an atomic bomb. Unqualified accounts of mischievous adventures in the 1970s would 
suggest that these shafts are relatively narrow and provide access via ladders rather than 
steps.55  
 
Figure 4. A July 1988 photograph of signage in the cable tunnel crossover indicating the scale of the 
distances to various exit shaft for GUTE. Ardwick 978 metres to the left and Dial House 900 metres, with 
Salford 1575 metres to the right. (Source: Tony Perry, English Heritage, ref. AA98/02434).  
All the surface buildings have been altered since their original construction and are 
significantly more ‘secure’ since the major tunnel fire in the GUTE of 2004 and burglary of 
2005 (see below for a more detailed account of these incidents). These exits are connected by 
the aforementioned cable tunnels (also able to accommodate maintenance teams) which stem 
from the main complex and include an offshoot to Dial House, another former massive GPO 
telephone exchange located in Salford. Dial House, and its later extension Irwell House, are 
situated on Chapel Street, north of the River Irwell, both are currently little documented in 
terms of their architectural genesis. Dial House was built in the late 1920s, from a design by 
architect Richard Allison (1869-1958), to meet rapidly growing demand for telephony and is a 
strange amalgam of functional load bearing masonry and applied classical detail, most notably 
                                                
55 ‘The top of the shaft had a narrow metal ladder fixed to the shaft wall which curved over at the top. When 
you’re 12 it’s not the easiest thing to just climb down there – there was no lighting then and you always ran the 
risk of your mates either leaving you or just dossing about and locking you in there. I was very wary of the ladder 
coming away and when you shone a torch down there, the stairs seemed to just drop down forever. It also seemed 
to drop down at a slight angle. There were light switches at the bottom of the shaft (and I mean it went down 
forever) and of course they didn’t work. The shaft bottom had a thick steel door at the bottom (it was painted grey 
(I think) and it had louvres that were shut. It also had grilles to the sides’. Unverified comment posted by ‘Tony-
B’ on weblog Mancubist, <www.mancubist.co.uk/2006/07/25/guardian-exchange-manchesters-cold-war-bunkers> 
[Accessed 12 November 2012]. 
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at its upper floors where a Romanesque portico has been added to cap the building.56 At the 
time its height and imposing scale on the river front site provoked critical comment.57 Irwell 
House, by comparison, is a purely functional modular concrete construction, much more 
explicitly of its period, it was built as an annexe to Dial some time in the late 1960s at a 
reported cost of £1m.58 
 
Figure 5. [image top left] The small surface building at the top of cable tunnel as originally constructed, 
Lockton Close, Ardwick, Manchester (Source: Courtesy of George Coney). [top right] The same location 
after being rebuilt and secured in 2005 (Source: Richard Brook). [lower left] The small surface building at 
the top on cable tunnel, Islington Street, Salford (Source: Courtesy of George Coney). [lower right] 
Additional security fencing installed around Islington Street access point. (Source: Richard Brook). 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
56 'Manchester's new telephone exchange', Manchester Guardian, 13 December 1929, p.3. For an opinionated 
contemporary article concerning the aesthetic appearance of the building, see Jonathan Schofield, 'The good, the 
standard, the ugly: Dial House, Salford', Manchester Confidential, August 2012, 
<www.manchesterconfidential.co.uk/Culture/Architecture/> [Accessed 12 November 2012]. 
 
57 Charles H. Reilly, 'A new building in Salford', Manchester Guardian, 21 August 1928, p.10. 
 
58 '£1M exchange', Guardian, 17 September 1969, p.20. 
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Construction and operation of GUTE (1950s-1970s) 
 The construction of the GUTE is partially documented in a 1974 article in the 
professional magazine Tunnels & Tunnelling59 and series of surviving photographs.60 Some 
views of the surface works in 1955 are also available from the Manchester Local Image 
Collection. (Figure 6 below)61 Despite the scale of the works in the heart of the city nothing 
seems to have been reported in the newspapers, perhaps due to the D Notice covering the 
project.  
 The GUTE purportedly cost just over two million to construct, with £1.6m expended on 
the tunnelling works,62 undertaken primarily by the civil engineering contractor Edmund 
Nuttall, Sons & Co. Ltd.63 The planning and design of tunnels was undertaken by Sir William 
Halcrow & Partners, who were leading engineering consultants of the time.64 The client was 
the Office of Works, subsequently the Ministry for Public Buildings and Works (MPBW) and 
later the Property Services Agency (PSA) of the Department of the Environment. The 
installation was managed by the GPO, but the PSA continued to act for the GPO on building 
matters until 1985.65  
 Surveys for the tunnel alignments were conducted at night between 2200 and 0600 
hours, for secrecy and to minimise traffic vibrations to the theodolites. In order to achieve 
accuracy the centres of certain connecting tunnels adopted the lines of main thoroughfares 
                                                
59 Collins, (1974), pp.30-33. It is this credible public account that provides the source of most of the description in 
this section. 
 
60 Taken by Patrick Gough. Scanned digital copies are available from George Coney’s website, 
<http://atomica.co.uk/guardian/>.  
 
61 See <http://images.manchester.gov.uk/>, refs: m56364, m56369, m56370, m56371.  
 
62 Comments by Mr. Stonehouse, Postmaster-General in House of Commons written answer, 21 October 1968. A 
version is available online at <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/written_answers/1968/oct/21/underground-
exchanges>. 
 
63 Collins (1974), p.30. 
 
64 They were responsible for many large tunnelling schemes in UK in last century including the Dartford and 
Mersey road tunnels. The were engineers for deep level London air raid shelters built in Second World War, along 
with the design of the Kingsways and Anchor underground exchanges in the 1950s. cf. <www.halcrow.com/Who-
we-are/History/>. 
 
65 Pers. comms. 5 June 2012 from a former GPO / BT employee with direct knowledge of GUTE. 
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above ground. (Figure 2 above) The first shafts for accessing the works were at George Street 
and at York Street (the sites of the remaining surface access building and Rutherford House 
respectively). These excavations were hazardous at the upper reaches as they were digging 
through rubble that had been bulldozed loosely into the basements of bombed buildings. The 
higher parts of the shafts were thus lined with cast iron rings and then mass concrete at the 
lower levels.  
 
Figure 6. A view, captured in 1955, of the prominent headgear located at Piccadilly needed to winch men 
and materials to the GUTE tunnel workings. The façade of the exchange at York House, York Street, is to 
the left of the image. (Source: Photograph by A. Dawson, 1955. Courtesy of Manchester Archives and Local 
Studies, ref. m56369.) 
 Drilling the smaller cable spur tunnels out to Salford and Ardwick was said to be quite 
straightforward and proceeded at a rate of about 18ft per week.66 (Figure 7) Spoil was removed 
by battery powered locomotives along several temporary tunnels, now filled in, and hoisted 
                                                
66 Collins (1974), p.31. 
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using electrically powered headgear. The tracks were subject to continuous maintenance due to 
the abrasive properties of the blasted sandstone. These routes also provided ventilation during 
the initial phase of construction in the mid 1950s, though this was far from adequate insofar as 
‘fumes from the explosives did not clear readily and it was always foggy during the week’.67 
According to original GPO records68 there were seven surface work sites associated with 
GUTE construction including a large shaft and winding tower at Piccadilly (Figure 6), 
positioned on a vacant site where the Plaza would eventually be built. Despite there only being 
seven sites on the schedule they are numbered 4, 5, 6, 7 and 11, 12, 13 which would suggest 
that there were other sites perhaps discounted during the land assembly and conveyance 
processes. The total number of known physical entry points is six; though there are likely other 
points of connection between the GUTE and the outside world – power, ventilation, sewer and 
pumping out water seepage, in addition signs in the tunnels themselves refer to shafts, 7, 4 and 
12. (Figure 2 above) It is likely that the site numbers were transferred to those allocated to the 
shafts and thus, Site 5, listed as ‘York St. and George St.’ became shaft 5.  
 A pilot tunnel was driven from the shafts to align with as many of the proposed sections 
as possible. Both this and the initial shaft excavations had problems with the ingress of water. 
However, as construction proceeded, the centrifugal pumps that were put in place began to 
work more and more efficiently until the only issues were presented where faults occurred in 
the rock. The cement and aggregates mixed to make the concrete were delivered in dry form to 
the concreting plant which was situated below ground. The storage of the dry materials at this 
level meant that they were subject to the absorption of moisture and the mix had to be closely 
monitored for its water content. The formwork for the concrete was struck and reset on the 
night shift and the pours took place during the day. The delivery pipes were variously formed 
from short lengths or were telescopic and either removed one by one or by a slow gradual 




                                                
67 Collins (1974), p.31 
 




Figure 7. Original photography documenting the construction of the GUTE, dated June 1955. Survey work 
in progress on one of the smaller cable tunnels. (Source: Photograph by tunnel engineer Patrick Gough. 









Figure 8. Original photograph documenting the construction of the GUTE, dated March 1956. The scale of 
the main equipment tunnel is evident and this was eventually subdivided to created two working levels. The 
formwork for concreting in the main tunnels was steel, but the connecting points between the tunnels were 
made by specialist joiners from timber. (Source: Photograph by tunnel engineer Patrick Gough. Courtesy 
of George Coney.) 
After several years of tunnelling, the major construction work on GUTE was completed 
in 1957 and the central underground spaces were fitted out with extensive telecommunications 
and supporting electrical equipment (Figure 9). As an operational exchange it came to life on 
the 7 December 1958 when the first traffic was received at 8am. The project was a major 
undertaking but apparently achieved to plan: ‘it is worthy of mention that the installation was 
completed within one week of the original target date of 1 December 1958, which was agreed 
in May 1956.’69 In operational configuration the core Guardian exchange comprised an 
approximate rectangle of four large interconnected spaces, with one elongated tunnel (A.T.8) 
                                                
69 ‘Manchester trunk mechanisation’, Post Office Electrical Engineers Journal (POEEJ), 52 (April 1959), p.77, 
78. 
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stretching for approximately 120 metres under Back George Street towards Rutherford House 
(Figure 2 above). A.T.8 which was divided into two floors, the upper half of this, the main 
chamber, housed telecommunications equipment to handle traffic from 1,488 incoming 
circuits. It was here that the familiar perforated vertical face of the main distribution frame 
(MDF) and the repeated racks of electromechanical switches, aesthetic icons of mid-century 
communications, were situated. 
The M.D.F. comprises 45 verticals, and an unusual feature of the frame is the use of 
connexion strips in place of Protectors H.C. and Test where the circuits are wholly 
underground; this should reduce fault liability. The switching equipment, consisting of 
some 219 racks is arranged symmetrically around an I.D.F of 67 verticals, reducing 
cable runs to a minimum. All cable and wire is p.v.c insulated. … The trunking scheme 
employs first, second and third switching stages, all selectors being of the motor-
uniselector group-selector type.70 
 
Figure 9. View of racks of telecommunications equipments being installed in the top half of the main 
Apparatus Tunnel 8 in April 1958. (Source: Original photograph by tunnel engineer Patrick Gough. Scan 
courtesy of George Coney.) 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
70 POEEJ (1959), p. 77. 
 27 
 The lower level A.T.8 was partitioned into series of room for the use of personnel. 
Images and descriptions of rooms on the lower level serve as a reminder of the exchange’s 
possible uses during atomic attack. The rooms were a series of chambers off a narrow corridor. 
One of these chambers was a kind of ‘war room’, described in a newspaper article in 1983 to 
be small and to contain a wall-sized map of Britain.71 According to Keith Warrender’s book 
this room also housed a safe containing instructions on how to operate the GUTE during an 
emergency.72 Other spaces included a first aid room, dining room, maintenance office, kitchen, 
male and female toilets and a cloakroom. Emergency food rations were reportedly refreshed 
around every sixteen months. A piano, pool table and a fish tank could be found in the 
recreation room and the piscine theme continued in the canteen, where Duffy observed an 
aquarium of tropical fish on his visit in 1983.73 Mirrors on the walls are said to have been used 
to enhance the lighting and sense of space and emergency beds were also stored in the lower 
tunnel.74  
 The other large interconnecting tunnels A.T. 3, 5 and 7 contained subsidiary equipment 
necessary for functional underground exchange, along with supporting workspaces (see Figure 
2 above). The provision of electricity was elemental to GUTE operations and the ‘power plant 
[was] of the “no-break” type incorporating a motor-alternator which, in the event of a mains 
failure, [was] run from a 240-volt battery until the prime-mover supply takes over. Three 
279kW diesel-alternator sets provide a standby power supply in the event of mains failure. 
They incorporate[d] synchronizing gear so that the three sets can be run in parallel.’75 It is 
known that two of the generators were manufactured by Crossley and were named Jane and 
Marilyn, apparently named after the 1950s icons Russell and Monroe. These were housed in 
upper floor of A.T.5 along with a third smaller, ‘auto-start’ electrical generator and associated 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
71 Michael Duffy, ‘The truth about Manchester’s nuclear bunker’, Manchester Evening News, 22 March 1983, pp. 
32-33. 
 
72 Keith Warrender, Below Manchester (Timperley, Cheshire, 2009). 
 
73 Duffy, 22 March 1983, pp.32-33. 
 
74 Some sense of the condition of these rooms can be gained from ‘hogshawrabbits’ amateur video tour 
undertaken in 1996. See also the 1998 BBC Midlands Today news report inside Anchor, 
<www.youtube.com/watch?v=28e35wmElCY>. 
 
75 ‘Manchester trunk mechanisation’, Post Office Electrical Engineers Journal (POEEJ), 52 (April 1959), p.77. 
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switchgear and distribution-control cabinets. Connected to A.T.5 is a smaller side tunnel that 
served as the fuel store for the standby generators. A.T.3 contained electrical switchgear in the 
upper half and banks of lead acid batteries for emergency power in the lower floor. Lastly 
A.T.7 contained a substantial workshop area and technical stores, along with equipment 
associated with ventilation for the tunnel complex. 
Beyond knowledge about the spaces and equipment there are no published details on 
the day-to-day operation of the exchange in 1960s, nor are there any photographs documenting 
the workers and activities in GUTE. Staffing was organised into three groupings of engineers 
according to responsibilities: automatic trunk switching, trunk test and repeater station, and 
lastly the ‘power group’ who maintained the tunnels. There is need for more research on the 
operational phase of the life of GUTE. The entire complex was distinctly functional not simply 
in the provision of the necessary equipment, but in the applied colour palette and material 
finishes of muted military beiges and greens, typical of 1950s Ministry of Works. The white 
light of the fluorescents seen in photographs and video has a stark quality befitting of the 
utilitarian nature of the spaces, but not very comforting or forgiving; as the staff levels were 
minimised in later years of operation it must have been particularly eerie to be the sole 
occupant of the tunnels. 
‘In the warm summer months we were able to keep the temperature under control by 
chilling the air with a fridge plant as in was drawn into the complex and then again in 
the wintertime it was nice to be able to come in out of the cold due to the way in which 
the air could be recycled within the complex. … I believe we all got on well for the 
most part – otherwise I would not have stayed down in the tunnel for 28 years!! There 
was a fully equipped  workshop and many of the Power Engineers were very skilled 
men. If you needed expert advice on any DIY project, whether welding; plumbing; 
lathe skills; or any electrical matter, help and advice was always at hand. In my view it 
was a happy place in which to work.’76  
  While there is little detail on the operation of exchange through the 1960s and early 
1970s there were several noteworthy events in relation to GUTE around the end of the decade. 
The most significant was the official announcement on 7 October 1968 by John Stonehouse, 
                                                
76 Email message (undated) to George Coney from Malcolm Graham, Technical Officer, Level 1 Manager, GUTE, 
1959-1988. Copy provided to the authors by George Coney. 
 
 29 
Postmaster General, of the existence of the Guardian tunnels. This act of declassification was 
reported in the Guardian newspaper under the headline, ‘City kept ten-year telephone 
‘secret’’77. The occasion of Stonehouse’s visit to Manchester was open a new surface exchange 
(we assume this was in Irwell House, adjacent to Dial House, Salford that was to augment 
GUTE). It is unclear why the D-Notice around the project was dropped at this time but 
mundane logic was expounded later that month in Parliamentary written answer by Stonehouse 
to a probing question from Frank Allaun then MP for Salford East and prominent anti-bomb 
campaigner:   
‘The exchanges were provided as part of national civil defence planning and were 
consequently subject to a Defence Notice. Since the London “Kingsway”, Birmingham 
“Anchor” and Manchester “Guardian” exchanges have now lost their defence significance, 
there is no longer any reason why knowledge of their existence should be withheld and this 
has now been released to the public.’78 
Associated with the new telephone exchange was a short extension to the existing Guardian 
cable tunnel in Salford.79 Built at the end of the 1960s it provided direct subterranean access 
into Irwell House but it seems its construction was not without incident. In January 1969 a fire 
occurred when workmen jointing cables accidentally set some petrol cans alight and firemen 
‘walked for more than a mile’ to extinguish the blaze.80 In the next year the problem was 
serious flooding which required significant pumping efforts to stem.81  
 
                                                
77 Michael Morris, 'City kept ten-year telephone secret', The Guardian, 8 October 1968, p.4.  Similar newspaper 
articles appeared about Anchor, e.g. 'This is it - the hush hush never centre', Birmingham Evening Mail, 11 
October 1968. While the Kingsway exchange was even the feature for 1 minute Pathe News report in 1968, 'Under 
London Trunk Telephone', <www.britishpathe.com/video/under-london-trunk-telephone/>. 
 
78 Mr. Stonehouse, Postmaster-General, in House of Commons written answer, 21 October 1968. A version is 
available online at <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/written_answers/1968/oct/21/underground-exchanges>. 
 
79 Tunnels & Tunnelling, Vol. 4(3), May 1972, p.200-201. 
  
80 ‘Fire alarm below ground’, The Guardian, 4 January 1969, p.4. 
 
81  'Fight with flood 130 feet under city', Manchester Evening News, cited in Keith Warrender, Underground 
Manchester (Timperley, Cheshire, 2007). 
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GUTE in decline (1980s-2012) 
The opening of Irwell House in Salford at the start of the 1970s provides a marker to 
the next phase of GUTE as its utility as major telephone exchange began to diminish. Through 
the 1980s there was rapid development in digital telecommunications, the existing switching 
and signal repeater equipment in the GUTE had undoubtedly come to the end of its operational 
life. The nature of the constrained tunnel location would also have mitigated against 
possibilities of large-scale upgrades and refurbishment.      
Descriptions of the main working areas of the exchange tunnel are few and far between, 
Michael Duffy, a Manchester Evening News reporter paid a visit in 1983 in an attempt to dispel 
some of the mythology surrounding the installation. Duffy’s article entitled ‘The truth about 
Manchester’s nuclear bunker’82 is a good example of a first hand account of the GUTE and also 
the enduring media interest in exposing secret sites. It should also be noted that the article was 
published six years before the fall of the Berlin Wall, generally marking the end of the Cold 
War and was written to engage readers of the newspaper. Duffy reported rumours claiming the 
tunnels were a nuclear shelter for the ‘chosen few’ during an attack, were reaching such a 
magnitude that the City Council had requested of Greater Manchester Council (GMC) that the 
exchange be opened as an emergency nuclear centre. (It is worth remembering there were 
renewed concerns about nuclear war in the early 1980s, prompted in part by the deployment 
American cruise missiles to bases in Britain as highlighted by the Greenham Common 
women’s peace camp which started in 1981.) As Duffy recounted’ ‘…the Labour group on the 
GMC ruled that its leaders would refuse places offered to them in the Piccadilly Shelter’.83 
Although the GUTE was physically vulnerable to the nuclear attack and could not realistically 
have served as a civilian shelter, this appears to demonstrate a time when even the rumour of 
such was liable to engender resentment between the governing institutions and the general 
public.  
 Duffy’s newspaper account described the tunnels as ‘an outdated product of the Cold 
War’ and explained that the GUTE was not equipped to serve such a governmental function 
and was actually at risk of becoming obsolete for even basic telecommunications operations 
                                                
82 Michael Duffy, ‘The truth about Manchester’s nuclear bunker’, Manchester Evening News, 22 March 1983, pp. 
32-33. Copy provided to the authors by George Coney. 
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due to advances in digital exchange technology. According to a former BT Executive Officer, 
between 1973 and 1974 long term plans were prepared concerning digital operations for the 
next twenty years.84 These directions included the decommissioning of the trunk unit in the 
GUTE and that the network be fully fibre-optic by 1991. Prior to his retirement in 1983, Roy 
Howard, then Planning Controller for BT, set about vigorously finding a new use for the 
GUTE, to no avail. He had considered that it may have had some value in advancing the Picc-
Vic heavy rail tunnel project, but could not convince the Passenger Transport Executive (PTE) 
of such. The Greater Manchester Police were also approached to see if they had any ‘Special 
Branch purposes’ that would suit the site and the Greater Manchester Council (GMC) were 
averse to the associations with anything ‘nuclear’ as they were ‘Working for a Nuclear Free 
City’ at the time.85 By his actions Howard had inadvertently stirred a hornets nest and measures 
were taken to publicise the fact that there was indeed no nuclear material or other atomic 
related activities within the complex. Howard retired in 1984 when the regional office closed, 
but high level interest in the disposal of the asset continued; BT Chairman (Sir) Ian Vallance is 
said to have walked the cable tunnel from Dial House to York House.86 
 In 1996 there was an unauthorised weekend visit by a BT employee and his friend 
where a significant amount of amateur video filming of the main GUTE tunnels was shot. 
About one hour of the footage was originally made available on the Internet sometime in 2010 
posted by user ‘hogshawrabbits’ on the website YouTube.87 As far as we are aware this was the 
only publicly available film footage of the tunnels and exchange. It is handheld footage, which 
is at times poorly shot and with only ambient lighting, but it does provide a fascinating detail 
on the size of different spaces of the GUTE, their condition and fittings in the mid 1990s. It 
also gives a good ‘feel’ for the GUTE. With careful study and listening to the audio 
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commentary it is possible to trace out approximately the route these two visitors took around 
the exchange.  
 An authorised visit by the Manchester Civic Society in 1997 revealed more details 
concerning the working lives of the GPO personnel and described the accommodation and 
canteen rooms as ‘very much Civil Service circa late 1960s’.88 Shortly after this archaeologists 
and a professional photographer from English Heritage also conducted a photographic 
recording exercise for the National Monuments Record as part of their broader study of Cold 
War heritage sites.89 While much of original telecommunications equipment seems to have 
been place when the EH photographs were taken, the exchange had long since been 
decommissioned.  
This pattern of opening-up the GUTE, with authorised access by journalists, urban 
conservationists and official archaeologists by the end of the 1990s would seem to indicate that 
the exchange had long since ceased to have a strategic national role and was no longer even 
serving a significant technical role for BT (except its use as a space for cabling beneath the 
city), or for anyone else, at that time and perhaps that the company was considering 
relinquishing its control of this piece of aging infrastructure. Permanent staffing underground 
ended at some point in late 1980s and shifted largely into a care and maintenance approach, 
with necessity to keep pumps working to prevent flooding. Indeed in spring 2002 stories in the 
local press, spurred in part by the release of original construction photographs taken by Patrick 
Gough90, claimed that BT were ‘looking to rent out some of the 25ft-wide sections of the 
underground kingdom and have started a massive refurbishment programme to ensure that the 
tunnels are safe for workers, or any company wishing to take the unique city space.’91 These 
speculative plans for some kind of commercial re-use of the GUTE never come to anything and 
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were likely completely quashed by the major fire in March 2004 that graphically highlighted 
the safety issues with people working in the tunnels, particularly in relation to evacuation. (BT 
has, however, subsequently tried to sell the Kingsway exchange tunnels in central London; see 
footnote 28 earlier.) 
Now long redundant of its original function, and with the threat of nuclear war having 
receded into history, the GUTE could be perceived as merely a pointless subterranean void, 
nothing more than a curious architectural relic from the Cold War. This perception is not 
wholly true, as the tunnels continue to operate as a piece of vital infrastructure, allowing the 
information-age city to function. The underground network serves as an existing, secure space 
to install fibre-optic cables without forming new, deep and expensive excavations. This process 
allows the city to progress telecommunications advances with minimal disruption and greatly 
reduced financial costs. Communications infrastructure is integral to the smooth function of 
cities, and if anything such systems are becoming even more significant to facilitate everyday 
activities and enable places to operate on a global level serving to draw commercial validity to 
an urban area. There are no public details to document what is currently operational in the 
GUTE and it is only speculation that it remains a significant point of physically vulnerability 
for the region’s digital network, hence BT’s continued degree of secrecy and heightened 
security. 
 Aside from the inherent physical permanence of the GUTE,92 and its security from its 
subterranean position and constrained entry points, its function as a piece of infrastructure 
equates to cultural permanence through a widespread lack of technological comprehension (or 
even awareness) by the general public. Infrastructure, almost by definition, is about being 
invisible and ignored. Taking such underground systems for granted, assuming that such 
utilities are always ‘on’ and working, implies an image of permanence and stability. In contrast 
to this image of permanence and stability, systems of infrastructure are often delicately 
balanced, prone to failure, highlighting the vulnerability of urban processes that rely heavily 
upon them. Most infrastructures also require continuous monitoring (as failures have serious 
consequences) and careful maintenance by a small but highly skilled engineering labour force. 
 The cultural perception of the GUTE is partly based on how much people understand 
the operational system or what depends upon it. As with many complex technologies, the user 
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relies only on the performance of the system, with little or no understanding of what makes up 
its constituent parts or how it works. (The enormous electricity system is the most archetypal 
case.)93 Alongside the secrecy during construction of the GUTE and its first decade of 
operation, the telecommunication network has also become ‘culturally’ invisible as a piece of 
infrastructure. Sociologists of science, such as Susan Leigh Star, describe how one of the 
defining characteristics of technological systems, which achieve the cultural status of 
infrastructure, is that they become ‘visible upon breakdown’.94 GUTE’s reawakening through 
disruption was vividly realised in the 2004 Manchester ‘phone crisis’. A fire on 29th March in 
part of the GUTE tunnel network caused damage to key cables and knocked out some 130,000 
telephone lines95 affecting many services that rely on the functioning of this infrastructure. The 
fire broke at 2.30am about 150m from the base of the York Street shaft,96 (though reports were 
inaccurate in describing the access as via Rutherford House, the lack of information was 
evident as the news teams rushed to provide details the breaking story). Apparently fire alarms 
in the GUTE were not operable and apparently ‘the fire service were not alerted until 3.28am, 
when a worker at a Chinese restaurant saw black smoke billowing out of a tunnel vent in 
George Street and rang 999’.97   
We know something of the circumstances of the fire from public court documents 
arising from subsequent legal action between the contractor and their insurer over liability.98 It 
seems a quite substantial project had been ongoing to remove asbestos from the cable tunnels 
which has required construction of polythene screening in the tunnel crossover section, under 
the core of GUTE, to create a sealed work space.  
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‘It has been pleaded by BT that the cause of the fire was an electrical fault, the most 
likely source of ignition being an incendive fault associated with the fluorescent light 
fitting or with the cabling to that fitting. It has been alleged that in the course of the 
construction of the airlock the Defendant damaged the light fitting or the cable (by 
cutting or otherwise damaging it while cutting the plastic sheeting or adhesive tape used 
to construct the tight air seal). This caused electrical arcing or resistive heating to occur 
which gave rise to a risk of ignition over time. Further, the materials used by the 
Defendant ignited easily.’99 
This has clear resonance to the January 1969 fire in cable tunnel, said to have been 
caused by contractors. However the scale of damage seems to have been much larger in 2004 
fire – BT was seeking £15 million in compensation from its contractors100 - and the wider 
impact on telecommunications was significant. Companies as far away as Sweden, who had 
their websites physically hosted by Manchester providers, were affected and the nuanced 
complexity of the telecommunications system was highlighted by a street in Macclesfield 
where lines were out on one side of the road and working normally on the other.101 Failure of 
this system cost Manchester businesses approximately £4.5million a day,102 highlighting the 
continued technical relevance of the tunnels of the GUTE in the contemporary city. This is 
exemplar of the vulnerability that originates from the reliance of infrastructural networks on 
other uncontrollable networks and can result in countless ways in which failures may cascade. 
In the case of the Manchester ‘phone crisis’ parts of the emergency services were unable to 
take 999 calls or maintain communication with staff resulting in the deployment of extra units 
of police across the region. Many businesses struggled to operate without telecommunications 
and banks in the city were unable to process transactions, affecting wider financial systems. 
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 The depth of reliance on infrastructure to the daily unfolding of contemporary urban 
life in industrialised countries and the disruption evident upon failure supposedly makes such 
networks possible targets for terrorist attack. A pervasive fear of a ‘securocratic’103 war has led 
to everyday failures of infrastructures to initially being interpreted as terrorism related. This 
theory manifested itself on 21 July 2005 when the GUTE was broken into on the same day as 
the failed bombing attempts on London. Police treated the break-in as a terrorist attack and 
deployed multiple units to the tunnels: ‘Officers were tipped off after British Telecom received 
complaints about problems with phone lines in the city. It was discovered there had been a 
break-in at a small BT building in Islington Street, Salford.’ 104 The forensic team reportedly 
found a discarded cigarette butt and subsequent DNA analysis provided evidence used to 
secure a conviction for theft against a 29 year old Salford man. Viewing the GUTE as a 
possible terrorist target likely explains part of the motive for the significantly improved 
security features around the tunnel exits (see Figure 5 above).105 Yet there is little or no 
evidence that terrorists have taken an active interest in targeting underground infrastructure – 
Hollywood movie plot scenarios and CIA security discourse aside.  
In the centre of Manchester pedestrian connections to the GUTE have altered in 
response to the rationalisation of the BT estate. York House was sold off by BT and the 
connections to Rutherford House were sealed and secured, it now accommodates various 
companies in leasable office space. Rutherford House, the site of one of two central shafts to 
the Guardian Exchange, used to contain British Telecom offices and extensive 
telecommunications equipment. It became surplus to requirements and was sold off to 
Bruntwood in 2005 and renamed The Exchange.106 From the upper ground floor and above it is 
now a commercial office building, following a refurbishment by Roger Stephenson Architects 
in 2008, the ground floor and basement are still used by BT. Evidence of physical connections 
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to the underground exchange can be seen on the façade of the building where maintained 
signage indicates the position of service risers and suggests they are still active.107 
Conclusion - tunnel visions 
 Whilst the Manchester Evening News journalist Michael Duffy mentioned the location 
and physical design of the GUTE was still important for communications in the city, and 
despite his efforts to dispel the growing folklore focused on nature of the tunnels, ‘The bunker 
myth is now wearing a bit thin on the 20 strong band of engineers who man the exchange 
round the clock’,108 speculation persisted and urban legends have proliferated subsequently. 
Despite the real mundane nature of these dank tunnels, they have, over recent decades, and in 
an era of X-Files conspiracies and government cover-ups, acquired a certain mythology 
particularly amongst a subcultures concerned with infiltrating hidden and normally inaccessible 
spaces of the city. The vision of this unorthodox subculture, broadly known as ‘Urban 
Explorers’, revolves around inbred fascination with ‘going where you’re not supposed to go’, 
mixed with a degree of adrenalin from the real risks of physical harm and potential legal 
consequences associated with accessing spaces like the GUTE.109 As well as real world 
escapades this group expound their actions in online forums and photographic essays. There 
are individuals who claim to have made limited and unsanctioned forays down the GUTE and 
have produced photographs to corroborate their account.110 Other discourse includes one-
upmanship concerning who has the most ‘elite’ knowledge about entry points, security 
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protection or is able to present new source material for collective research purposes. This 
created version of the tunnels not only perceives them as some kind of holy grail of this 
particular subculture, it is also able to sustain a form of myth attached to a mundane piece of 
fifty year old infrastructure. Maybe the only way to finally put them to rest is to open a visitor 
centre and offer guided tours.111  
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 This article is a preliminary summary of Guardian Underground Telephone Exchange 
from publicly available sources. We acknowledge that there is more detail to excavate on the 
construction, operation and current state of the Guardian tunnels and we welcome further 
information. Our research was undertaken for the Infra_MANC exhibition (held in RIBA Hub / 
CUBE Gallery, February-March 2012) and drew, in parts, upon Permanent Structure 
Redundant Programme: An enquiry into how the perception of the ‘Guardian Underground 
Telephone Exchange’, an unpublished dissertation submitted to the Manchester School of 
Architecture for the degree of Bachelor of Architecture by Nicholas J. Mitchell, 2010. We are 
grateful to Nicholas Mitchell for permission to use his work. We would also like to 
acknowledge George Coney for his openness in sharing his extensive digital collection of 
GUTE photographs and materials relating to the tunnels in response to a simple email sent by 
the authors. He pioneered public investigation of GUTE through his website cybertron 
<http://atomica.co.uk/guardian/>. Nick Catford and Richard Lamont (Subterranea Britannica), 
and Wayne Cocroft (English Heritage) provided prompt and positive responses to our 
‘underground’ email queries. Helpful information and comments on the research were received 
from people with first hand experience of GUTE most especially Malcolm Graham. 
 
The authors would welcome further details on the design, construction and operation of GUTE.  
Email: richard.brook@mmu.ac.uk or m.dodge@manchester.ac.uk 
